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Wittgenstein's Instructive 
Narratives: Leaving the Lessons 
Latent 
Thomas D. Eisele 
I find that [Wittgenstein's] Philosophical Investigations often fails to make clear the 
particular way in which his examples and precepts are to lead to particular, 
concrete exercises and answers, for all his emphasis upon this aspect of philoso-
phy. At the same time, his book is one of the great works about instruction-the 
equal, in this regard, of Rousseau's Emile and of Kierkegaard's, Philosophical 
Fragments. 
-Stanley CavelJI 
77 
Philosophical Investigations is one of the great works about instruction, as 
Stanley Cavell says, because it is a great work of instruction. It dot::s not 
simply tell us about instruction; it shows us instruction in action-by 
instructing us. But it does this in a disconcerting way; it instructs us 
indirectly or latently. And often it uses stories to do this. 
Wittgenstein rarely states a thesis or a conclusion that he then wants us 
simply to approve or accept. Rather, he directs our attention to some fact or 
phenomenon and invites our response to it, sometimes by giving us his 
response to it, sometimes by leading us with questions, sometimes by telling 
a story that he seems to think will show us something, sometimes by simply 
leaving us to our own devices to make of it what we will. Sometimes he 
anticipates our response and criticize.s it, or elaborates it, extends it, or 
compares it with another. Or sometimes he leaves us pondering his 
example or story and moves on, expecting us to follow in good time at our 
own pace. Always, however, there is the teacherly guidance of our atten-
tion, and the questioning or quizzical tone that puts us on our guard and 
solicits our best efforts for the problem at hand. 
In a journal devoted to teaching in la,,, school and within the parameters 
set by our announced topic, "The Pedagogy of Narrative," I expect two 
aspects of what I have just said to interest my readers immediately. First, my 
abbreviated description of Wittgenstein's philosophical practice should 
Thomas D. Eisele is Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. This article uses 
material from the author's doctoral dissertation, Wittgenstein's Normative Naturalism, De-
partment of Philosophy, University of Michigan (1984). The author remains grateful for the 
help he received on that initial work from the members of his dissertation committee: Stephen 
L. White, Frithjof Bergmann, Kendall Walton, and James Boyd White. This revision of the 
dissertation was prepared with the support of a summer research grant from the University of 
Tennessee College of Law, for which he also is grateful. 
The author dedicates this article to the memory of his father, Karl A. Eisele, Jr., who was, 
among so much else, his first teacher and storyteller. 
1. Stanley Cavell, Foreword: An Audience for Philosophy, in Must We Mean What We 
Say? at xxv (New York, 1969) (emphasis in original). 
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suggest to law teachers that their pedagogical practice matches his in a 
number of ways. In fact, they share with Wittgenstein both motive and 
method. As far as motive is concerned, both want to get their students to 
think for themselves, because their professional problems, by their very 
nature, can be solved only by the kind of individual and team effort that 
imagines every person and member capable of carrying his or her fair share 
of the work. To get students to think for themselves entails in large part 
getting them to learn for (or by) themselves. They acquire the tools of a 
prpfessional (lawyer or philosopher) largely through a form of self-
instruction, a kind of learning by doing on their own. As far as method is 
concerned, Wittgenstein and law teachers have at least the following 
practices in common: both direct students' attention to a text (a case or a 
statute, for example, or an expression); both focus their attention on such 
a text and hold it there2; both ask the text (and the students) questions; both 
tell their students stories and construct hypotheticals that are meant to 
stretch the moral of the original text in different directions; both seek to 
enliven their students' sense of the varieties of possible response to a 
problem in its various guises; and so on. When described in these terms, 
Wittgenstein's teaching method is remarkably similar to what law teachers 
are doing when they use some variant of the Socratic method. And, if this 
is so, then to this extent Wittgenstein's method is our method. So what we 
learn about his teaching can become a means of learning about our own 
teaching. Thus, learning about another becomes a route to self-knowledge. 
This is as it should be. 
Second, I expect my readers to be interested in my claim -explicit in my 
tide-that a central part of Wittgenstein's teaching is his use of stories, or 
narrative. This claim may surprise someone familiar with Wittgenstein's 
writings, because they do not on the whole take a narrative form. But their 
invocation of narratives at certain junctures I find to be a point of intimate 
contact between Wittgenstein's practice and the teaching of law, yet one 
that neither philosophers nor law teachers have much studied.3 I propose 
to study it. I will examine Wittgenstein's use of narrative in the opening 
section of the Investigations as one means of beginning to understand his 
teaching (by which I mean, his philosophy) and our teaching. 
I. Reminding Ourselves With Stories 
Section 1 of the Investigations is representative of-indeed, central 
to-the rest of the writing in the book. It begins Wittgenstein's instruction 
in some of the central lessons of the book; it uses narrative to exemplify its 
lessons; and it illustrates the pedagogical values and choices embedded in 
the Investigations. Of the four paragraphs that compose section 1, two are 
2. See James Boyd White, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1669, 
1670-71 (1984). My debt to White's characterizations of the teaching and practice orIaw 
is pervasive; see especially James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination (Boston, 1973), 
and Heracles' Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetry of Law (Madison, 1985). 
3. I have also discussed Wittgenstein and the practice and teaching of law in Thomas D. 
Eisele, The Activity of Being a Lawyer, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 345 (1987), and The Legal 
Imagination and Language, 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 363 (1976). 
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narratives. The first paragraph consists of a story that Wittgenstein quotes 
from St. Augustine's Confessions, in which Augustine tells how he learned to 
speak. The fourth paragraph is a story that Wittgenstein tells as a way of 
beginning to show us that Augustine's story is misleading in its implications. 
Sandwiched between the two stories are two paragraphs: in one Wittgen-
stein explicates the linguistic and semantic themes implied by Augustine's 
story; in the other he offers some initial criticisms. So section 1 begins and 
ends with stories and in between contains an explication and criticism of 
one of the stories. 
Let me begin with the first paragraph of section 1: 
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards 
something. I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they 
uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily 
movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the 
face. the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body. and the tone 
of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking. having. rejecting, or 
avoiding something. Thus. as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places 
in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; 
and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my 
own desires:! 
In the eighth section of Book One of his Confessions, St. Augustine 
ponders how he changed from an infant to a young boy, and particularly 
how he came to be "a chattering boy."5 Then Augustine, in response to this 
self-reflection, this self-questioning, describes how he remembers learning 
to speak: "When they (my elders) named some object, ... " 
Augustine is not presenting us with a theory of language-learning or a 
philosophy of speech-acquisition; he is telling us a story, giving us a 
narrative, that he believes best describes or accounts for how he came to 
speak. This story comes about as an attempt to recollect something from his 
past that obviously happened; that is, because Augustine now speaks but 
did not when he was born, he obviously learned to speak at some time in the 
past. But now Augustine, in his confessional meditation, seeks to recall and 
describe how this occurred. 
Augustine wonders how he came to be a babbling boy, and in seeking an 
answer to this puzzle, he offers an altogether ordinary reconstruction of the 
process. Crudely cast, it is: "Well, I must have watched my parents and 
others, who taught me the names of things. This they did by saying the 
names in my presence and simultaneously connecting those names with the 
objects they named (by pointing to them as they said the name). I learned 
these words and their correct connections, and when I did I discovered that 
I could express myself, my own wishes, and desires. That is how I learned 
to talk." Some such description of how anyone comes to learn language is 
quite natural. But it cannot be right. 
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations § 1a. trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. 3d ed. 
(New York. 1968). In this passage, Wittgenstein quotes St. Augustine in Latin; the 
translation appears as a footnote. Further references to Philosophical Investigations will be 
cited parenthetically in the text by section and paragraph. Emphases. oddities of 
punctuation. and the British spelling in the quotations are all in the original text. 
5. The Confessions of St. Augustine. trans. John K. Ryan, 50 (Garden City. 1960). 
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Augustine's story purports to be a matter-of-fact recollection, a memory 
of a particular event or process, and it cannot be. No child has the 
mentallIinguistic means by which to conceive-and hence to remember-
the nature of the language-learning process that goes on between parent 
and child. Indeed, there is a sense in which no child has the means even of 
noticing that any such process is taking place, or remembering that it did 
take place. Of course, infants can participate in the process; if they could not, 
there could be no learning oflanguage. But this only shows that infants can 
be absorbed into, can be made a party to, this process. They are prepared 
for it to commence; they are receptive to it; and often enough they start the 
game of learning language, provoking their parents or elders to answer 
back to some infantile utterance. 
That infants are capable of participating in the process does not show 
that they can remember it. And how many of us do remember how (or 
when) we learned to speak? I certainly do not remember it, and I doubt that 
anyone does. So, instead of remembering something that happened, 
Augustine is engaging in a time-honored philosophical activity; he is 
reconstructing a past, a history, as it "must" have happened, according to 
his present lights. His recollection is a fiction, a story, created as a likely 
description and explanation. "This is how it must have happened," he is 
saying to himself. And his frame of mind is familiar to philosophers: 
Augustine is speaking in (or out of) a philosophical mood. It is exactly this 
kind of mood that Wittgenstein wishes us to understand. 
Augustine is misled into speaking as though he were recalling something 
from his past, but what he offers us is a fable of language-learning. It is 
attractive in its purity, its precision, and its darity. But it is false. For 
Wittgenstein, we come to grief when we offer an account that does not 
comport with the humble facts of our lives. Yet, in philosophy, this 
frequently happens. 
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, essential, in our 
investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. 
That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, proof, 
truth, experience, and so on. This order is a super-order between-so to speak-
super-concepts. Whereas, of course, if the words "language", "experience", 
"world", have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words "table", 
"lamp", "door". (§97b) 
How might we realize the humility suggested by Wittgenstein, the 
tempering of the rambunctious human mind, which wants to know the 
great but ignores the small, which wants to know the supernatural while 
ignoring the natural? Wittgenstein's modest proposal is that we dispatch the 
illusions to which philosophers are heir (because they are human) by using 
reminders: we need to remind ourselves of where and 'who we are, of what 
we do, of how we in fact act, of what we in fact say, of how and why we use 
words, of what their functions, purposes, contexts, and points are or may 
be, and so forth. These reminders of humble facts are descriptions and 
examples that come in the form of stories, generically speaking; they are 
narratives intended to remind us of the significance that our actual words 
actually have, because in these narratives we can see the actual words in 
action. Wittgenstein wants to show us what our linguistic lives actually 
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consist in. "Don't say: 'There must be something common, or they would not 
be called "games" '-but look and see whether there is anything common to 
all" (§66a). And this showing is meant to begin an education. These 
narratives are intended to instruct us in the facts that can return us to our 
natural and normal forms of life, within which our words and stories and 
claims may make sense. 
When philosophers use a word-"knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposi-
tion", "name" -and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask 
oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is 
its original home?-
What we [Wittgensteinians] do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to 
their everyday use. (§1l6ab)6 
You say to me: "You understand this expression, don't you? Well then-I am 
using it in the sense you are familiar with." - As if the sense were an atmosphere 
accompanying the word, which it carried with it into every kind of application. 
If, for example, someone says that the sentence "This is here" (saying which he 
points to anpbject in front of him) makes sense to him, then he should ask himself 
in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make 
sense. (§1l7ab) 
Wittgenstein uses stories or narratives to provide us with "the facts of 
nature . . . [by means of which we can] understand something that is 
already in plain view" (§89b). These facts we need to consult when we find 
ourselves in a philosophical mood or quandary: "The work of the [Witt-
gensteinian] philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular 
purpose" (§127). Where do these reminders come from? In what form do 
they appear? We discover or create them in the stories and examples and 
descriptions we give one another in the light of the particular problem or 
quandary in which we find ourselves. Specific reminders, cast for specific 
frames of mind or moods, can be found throughout the Investigations, and 
these countless stories (often of the barest kind) are meant to bring us down 
to earth, where we belong. In various places, Wittgenstein calls this exercise 
of discovering or creating narrative reminders (which remind us of the facts 
we already know and live within but which we have yet even to consider or 
appreciate) describing or inventing "language-games." 
Where traditional philosophers speak in terms of a superorder of 
concepts and structures, a superreality, even something supernatural, 
Wittgenstein speaks simply and plainly of natural phenomena. "We are 
talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon oflanguage, not about 
some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm" (§108c). To remind us of the 
natural and normal phenomena of our lives, which taken together consti-
tute both the conditions and the ingredients of those lives, Wittgenstein 
describes language-games and, when necessary for his purposes, invents 
them. There is nothing wrong with this inventive storytelling capacity; in 
fact, his later philosophy encourages it. "[W]e can also invent fictitious 
natural history for our purposes" (Part II, p. 230a). 
II. Recognizing the Latency in Language 
In the remainder of section 1, Wittgenstein tells us (in the second 
paragraph) the implications of Augustine's story; then he tells us (in the 
6. See also §96. 
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third paragraph) some of the shortcomings or omissions in that story; and 
finally he shows us (in the fourth paragraph) some of the same shortcom-
ings or omissions by giving us a story of his own that serves as a 
counter-example. 
These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human 
language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects-sentences are 
combinations of such names.-In this picture of language we find the roots of 
the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the 
word. It is the object for which the word stands. 
Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. 
If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking 
primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only 
secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining 
kinds of word as something that will take care of itself. 
Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give 
him a slip marked "five red apples". He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who 
opens the drawer marked "apples"; then he looks up the word "red" in a table and 
finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers-I 
assume that he knows them by heart-up to the word "five" and for each number 
he takes an apple qf the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.-It is in 
this and similar ways that one operates with words.-"But how does he know 
where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 
'five'?"-Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Explanations come to an 
end somewhere.-But what is the meaning of the word "five"?-No such thing 
was in question here, only how the word "five" is used. (§lbcd) 
Wittgenstein's first move in investigating Augustine'S story is to gloss its 
linguistic and semantic themes. In doing so, he finds that the story contains 
a "picture of language" and that this picture contains the roots of a certain 
concept of meaning. Wittgenstein subdivides the linguistic picture into two 
theses and the semantic concept into three theses. Within these five theses, 
we find many of the basic topics of criticism in the Investigations. 
Augustine's story implies that "the individual words in language name 
objects" (§Ib). This implicit picture oflanguage characterizes words on the 
basis of how they function, how we use them. (It asserts that what we use 
them to do is to name things, objects.) But can this characterization 
seriously be meant to describe how all words function? I do not think it can. 
If Augustine's story were meant to cover all words and how they 
function, it would be laughably false. (Do verbs name things? What might 
prepositions name? And how are we to characterize the functions of 
conjunctions?) These are obvious challenges to Augustine's story, and they 
are made (or suggested) in Wittgenstein's first direct criticism of the story 
(§ Ic). But their sheer obviousness reveals not only the inadequacy of this 
"picture of language" but also the assumption or attitude of the person 
espousing it. Augustine's story -his implicit characterization of language-
is never intended to cover these other kinds of words. The question 
becomes, Why not? 
Wittgenstein's criticisms suggest that Augustine's story neglects other 
kinds of words because Augustine does not see them as essential constitu-
ents of language. And of course it is only the essential or important part of 
language-its "essence" -with which philosophy wishes, and claims, to 
deal. Other kinds of words are negligible for our purposes in philosophy-
after all, we are not philologists or lexicographers. We philosophers-
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people in a philosophical mood, suffering from philosophical 
puzzlement-therefore need not worry or bother about accounting for 
these words and their functions. However they may work and whatever 
they may do, they are not essential aspects of language and hence are not 
important for an accurate or useful or philosophically worthwhile account 
of language. 
For Wittgenstein, this philosophical move to rid the ground of "messy" 
facts, of the complications of life and the complexities of language, is 
misguided. A philosophy disconnected from the facts of nature, unrespon-
sive to the facts of life, is a bankrupt, failed philosophy. It offers us nothing 
vital, only mere illusions that mislead us. His way of doing philosophy is 
quite the opposite: 
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the 
end only describe it. 
For it cannot give it any foundation either. 
It leaves everything as it is. (§ 124abc) 
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their 
simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something-because it is always 
before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. 
Unless that fact has at some time struck him.-And this means: we fail to be struck 
by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (§129) 
For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the 
model as what it is, as an object of comparison-as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; 
not as a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into 
which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.) (§131) 
This dogmatism exists in the best of us, including Augustine, and it 
contains an element of intellectual arrogance.7 In describing how he came 
to speak, Augustine deems it necessary or relevant to discuss only how he 
came to learn the names of objects. For him, apparently, this is sufficiently 
representative or paradigmatic of how we learn language. Learning lan-
guage is learning the names of objects, or learning how to name objects. 
The implication is, then, that all words in language are such names, or at 
least all of the important or relevant words are such. The other words in 
language-to the extent that, under the spell or captivation of this picture, 
we recognize other words, other functions of words-somehow or for some 
reason do not seem to count, do not seem to matter. 
Why does Augustine offer this account in this context? Why does he 
seem satisfied with this account? Wittgenstein says, "Augustine does not 
speak of there being any difference between kinds of word" (§ Ic). Why does 
he not speak of this? Because he does not know that there are different 
kinds? This seems preposterous. Then is it that he simply ignores the 
difference as irrelevant? Or does he simply neglect the difference, missing its 
significance? Augustine'S sin of intellectual arrogance consists in his failure 
to acknowledge what he knows and we know. It is inconceivable that 
Augustine did not know of the multitude of word-functions to which 
Wittgenstein appeals again and again in his criticisms. But it is conceivable 
that Augustine did not think about them, carefully or circumspectly, and 
7. I have said more about this phenomenon in my article, Hegelian Vanity, Common Law 
Humility, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 915 (1989). 
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thus did not consider their impact on and implications for his "picture of 
language." And this failure is a failure to activate the knowledge he 
poss'esses, a failure to acknowledge what he (and everyone else) knows to be 
true about language: there are countless kinds of words, countless kinds of 
ways to use words, and all of these uses and functions and purposes and 
speech acts constitute "our language." 
Then how are we to remedy this failure; how can we activate our 
knowledge? How is anyone, in the grip of a philosophical mood, to find his 
or her way clear of the quick generalization or hasty rush to judgment? 
Again, according to Wittgenstein, we do it by reminders. We create coun-
terexamples, tell each other stories, describe and imagine various language-
games, all of which re-mind us-put us in mind of certain facts-so that our 
minds will be brought back to the solid ground of our ordinary lives and 
language. Thus, in this case, Wittgenstein reminds Augustine about what 
Augustine knows about language, which we know too. 
Wittgenstein's lesson is brought out by his telling us (in § Ic) and by his 
showing us (in §Id) that Augustine'S view of language is misleading and 
requires correction. Let me concentrate on the story he tells in the fourth 
paragraph (§Id). 
This little story is about a person taking to the grocer a slip of paper on 
which is written, "five red apples." Wittgenstein's intention is, I think, to 
keep his story as close as possible to the kind of linguistic activity that 
Augustine's picture of language suggests. The story shows that, despite this 
effort to follow Augustine, even a simple and straightfonvard use of 
language does not fit his picture. 
The slip of paper contains three different types of word: a number word, 
a color word, and an object word. Only "apple" functions in the way 
described by Augustine, as the name of an object. If "red" is also a name, 
it is the name of a color, and it is not at all clear that a color (or color sample) 
can be called an "object." An object may have a color, but the color does not 
seem to be the object (or any kind of an object itself). This problem is even 
more pronounced in the case of "five," because it is difficult to contend that 
this number word "names" an "object." Perhaps it is imaginable that in 
certain contexts "five" names a certain numeral, and that a numeral is a 
kind of an object. Even so, this is not what Augustine's picture of language 
implies. Instead, it suggests that all words name or refer to objects all the 
time. It is difficult to say what kind of an object a number might 
be-Platonic? ideal? mathematical? More importantly, Augustine's picture 
ignores the fact that we use numbers most frequently in counting and 
measuring and adding and subtracting (and so on), not in naming some-
thing. And none of these arithmetical functions seems to be a naming 
function. So "five" in Wittgenstein's story does not serve as the name of a 
particular number. 
The first point that Wittgenstein's story makes, then, is that there are 
different kinds of words based on their different functions. This point 
reinforces or demonstrates the criticism he states in the third paragraph. 
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But the story in the fourth paragraph shows more; it shows that words and 
their uses make sense only within a given context and within a frame of 
human activity and understanding. 
Even with this simple story, for example, we cannot understand what the 
grocer is doing with these words-how he is using the words written on the 
paper and submitted to him-without also understanding the context in 
which this use of language takes place. The three words written on the 
paper might be a question: "Do you have five red apples?" Or, "May 1 have 
five red apples?" And the grocer might respond by writing "yes" (or "no," 
or "never," or "I don't know") on the paper and handing it back to the 
person who brought it, who might then return with the grocer's message to 
the originator of the note. But the grocer does not do this because he 
understands-as we understand-that these words used in this context make a 
request for apples, not simply an inquiry. So the grocer fills the order. This 
makes sense to him (and to us), given the context. 
The context is latent in the story, as it is latent in the use of language 
described within the story. It is something that we must elicit (or assume, or 
simply understand) as we read; and we do elicit (or assume or simply· 
understand) it as we read. Otherwise, the story would make no sense to us. 
In addition, another latency in the story is the practical mastery in the use 
of language that we assume on the grocer's part (and that we as readers or 
observers call upon in making sense of the grocer's actions). 
Wittgenstein has one of his interlocutors inteIject, " 'But how does he 
[the grocer] know where and how he is to look up the word "red" and what 
he is to do with the word "five"?'-Well, I assume that he acts as I have 
described" (§ld). Knowing the meaning of the words "five" and "red" and 
"apples" entails being able to use them in this way (and in coundess other 
ways as well). Meaning is a matter of practical mastery, and it is demon-
strated in the way we act with words-and its loss is demonstrated when we 
fail to act with words as we should. 
The grocer may think that he knows what "five" means if he simply 
memorizes the sound and spelling of the word and can repeat or recognize 
it when it is spoken or written in his presence. But it is his ability to act with 
the word in appropriate ways within appropriate contexts-to say "the 
series of cardinal numbers" up to five when he needs them, or to count on 
his fingers, or to select an apple for every number that he says-that 
demonstrates his knowledge of language, his mastery of the meaning of 
"five." Without the practical activity, the mastery evidenced in use, his claim 
to know or understand this word would be empty. 
When we learn language, Wittgenstein suggests, we learn what to do with 
words, we learn what words are for, we learn how to put words together so 
as to make sense (of ourselves, of the world, ·to others). As J. L. Austin put 
it, we learn "how to do things with words."s Language is a way of acting, a 
way of speaking, a way of making sense, that we inherit as children. And 
this acquisition, Wittgenstein says, requires us to adopt or accept, to master, 
a "form of life." "[T]he speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a 
8. J. L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). 
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form of life" (§23b). To acquire this form of life, to participate in this 
activity, requires more than simply memorizing names and learning the 
object(s) they denote. 
This needs some qualification, however, since it is apt to sound as 
though, in learning language, a child learns "everything" by way of being 
taught it. And this is not true. It leaves out of account at least two matters: 
(1) that much of what we learn is implicit or latent in language; and (2) that 
a precondition to learning language is a certain realized capacity for action 
in the learner. 
Much of what we learn in learning language is not made explicit to us 
either in the teaching (by our parents) or in the learning (by us as speakers). 
It may be there, in the language, but first we must soak it up, absorb it, 
experience it, and then only later do we realize it. Only later do we discover 
that we have learned, for example, how to say a word and make ourselves 
understood by others; how to construct a sentence and convey a thought; 
what the difference is between two words that express related yet not 
identical ideas; how to find the right word for the right occasioni when to 
speak and when to remain silent; how to project a word or concept into an 
unexpected but acceptable context; how to make a play on words; how to 
"read" contexts and determine what is appropriate to say within them; how 
to understand and take the implications of words uttered just here just now 
by just this person; and countless other lessons about the pliancy and 
availability (as well as the. resiliency and durability) of language. What we 
learn about language is never simply what someone else teaches us about 
language, nor that which is explicit in the lesson taught or the example 
given. Rather, what we learn includes our ineffable, inarticulate experience 
of language as we learn it and as it matures within us (and as we mature 
within it). The implicit or latent is an irreducible component of learning 
language, and it is revealed gradually as we progress, maturing as speakers 
or writers or listeners, discovering the possibilities of the medium we have 
inherited. Of course, this entails that we make something out of the legacy 
handed down to us; we have to do something with what we are given. 
This leads to the second qualifying point: if education is to take place, 
then the learner of language must act, must do or say something. 
Wittgenstein insists that to learn language each child must bring something 
to his or her training; the child is as much an autodidact as a pupil. "[T]he 
possibility of getting him to understand will depend on his going on to write it 
down independently" (§143b). The possibility of getting a child to learn-to 
acquire, to inherit, to inhabit-a language depends on his producing or 
generating some actions or utterances of his own, on his own initiative or in 
response to his teacher's provocations. Without these, there is nothing for 
his teacher to work with, to mold or to shape or to train into our way of 
speaking. Without some expression of the learner's making, there will be no 
expression that he can have. And, even then, there is a limit to what a 
teacher can do to him or do for him. Much oflearning language is up to the 
learner, is dependent on what he or she does or fails to do. (This also 
implies that we create language as well as learn it, that it is malleable and 
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can be developed with talent and effort, and that language is a potential 
that we realize to a greater or lesser extent.) 
Augustine's account leaves out these aspects of learning language; or, 
rather, it assumes them as already a part of the picture he sketches, a part 
of the background against which-or the context within which-a child 
learns to speak. But, as Wittgenstein shows, it is exactly this latent 
background of activity and context that a child needs to acquire-and does 
acquire-in learning language. 
One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of 
asking a thing's name. But what does one have to know? (§30b) 
We may say: only someone who already knows how to do something with it can 
significantly ask a name. (§31d) 
To speak is to enter a form of life. This initiation into a form of life is the 
part of the inheritance, of the acquisition, that is essential, and it is what 
Wittgenstein labors so persistently to describe and to bring to our con-
sciousness. Because it is implicit or latent in language, it is difficult to 
describe, difficult to elicit or evoke; this is one reason Wittgenstein resorts 
to his odd, idiosyncratic methods (based on "criteria," "grammar," 
"language-games," and "forms oflife"), and it is one reason for the odd look 
of his writing. But only if he succeeds in describing this element of our 
language, of our lives, does Wittgenstein understand his later philosophy to 
be worth the effort expended in its pursuit. 
Augustine simply assumes, or passes over in silence, what is most in need 
of investigation. This is Wittgenstein's deepest criticism of Augustine's 
account of learn.ing language. 
And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human 
language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the 
language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. 
Or again: as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And 'think' would 
here mean something like 'talk to itself. (§32b) 
III. Showing the Latency in Learning 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy expresses and enacts a decidedly anti-
theoretical, antipropositional preference. Some people take this as evidence 
that Wittgenstein is unscientific, or at least unsystematic, in his phi19sophiz-
ing. I take it to show, instead, that the kind of knowledge and understand-
ing that Wittgenstein intends his investigations to produce and promote is 
of a kind that cannot be expressed or captured in theoretical terms or 
propositional form. This does not mean that it is esoteric; it remains a 
knowledge and understanding accessible to human beings and communi-
cable among them, but we cannot gain it by using theoretical tools or 
scientific methods or standard logical techniques based on propositional 
forms. Nor can we communicate it by these means. Wittgenstein's means of 
capturing and communicating this kind of knowledge and understanding 
are the methods or tools identified by the four distinctive terms of his later 
philosophy: "criteria," "grammar," "language-games," and "forms of life." 
These descriptive terms identify Wittgenstein's four ways of locating and 
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communicating a latent kind of knowledge and understanding, of which he 
wishes to bring us to consciousness, but which is difficult to bring to 
consciousness exactly because it is implicit or latent in our experience. In a 
sense, this kind of knowledge and understanding is too brittle or elusive to 
stand direct confrontation and description (as is attempted by theoretical, 
scientific, and logical methods). So Wittgenstein solves this problem by 
adopting another means for eliciting this kind of knowledge and under-
standing without falsifying it: he tells stories about it. "Narrative is a 
primary and powerful way by which to know about a whole. In an 
important sense, what a society (or a person) is, is its history."9 Stories 
enable Wittgenstein to capture and communicate the criteria, grammar, 
language-games, and forms of life by which and in which and through 
which we live and think and speak and act. 
Storytelling is not a last resort for Wittgenstein or even a second-best 
means of doing something that he wishes to do some other way but cannot 
(as though he aspired to be a scientist or logician, but had to settle for being 
a philosopher). No, he believes that something can be achieved through 
storytelling that othenvise cannot be done (neither in philosophy nor, 
hence, in education). What this pedagogical goal is can be seen by 
considering again how he uses stories in section 1 of the Investigations. 
Wittgenstein chooses to begin his book with a quotation from St. 
Augustine's Confessions. This choice reflects an educational strategy, one 
that Wittgenstein adopts frequently (but not solely), a choice between telling 
us what he means to teach us and showing us. Wittgenstein begins not by 
telling us what he wants to say or by explaining what he wants to do (or 
what he is doing) or how we are supposed to understand what he is saying 
or doing. No explicit pedagogical directions are given us; he tells us 
nothing. Rather, he begins as some novelists do, by injecting us into 
another's presence, into a conversation or reverie already ongoing or 
undenvay. Wittgenstein is showing his reader something, presenting him 
or her with something, and not immediately telling him or her anything 
about it. It is up to each reader to make something out of the quotation 
from Augustine, both in itself and in its place in this text. 
An analogy from the law school context may be useful here. In teaching 
property law, I can present a case in two ways. I can either ask my students 
to read it and formulate its holding(s) for themselves, or I can tell them 
what (I think) the case holds. In the first instance, I am asking them to 
determine what the case says, the relevant facts, and so on. Of course, in 
class I expect to help them through it, and perhaps I shall become so 
dissatisfied with all of the suggested formulations of the holding that I shall 
be forced to offer my own. Still, by prodding them with appropriate 
questions and directing their attention to certain facts or issues or equities, 
I expect them to teach themselves a great deal of the property law to be 
gained from the case. Thus, the burden of reading and understanding the 
case is first and foremost on them. In the second instance, the burden of 
9. Roben N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler & Steven M. 
Tipton, Habits of the Hean 302 (Berkeley, Calif., 1985). 
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understanding and expressing the salient points is first and foremost on 
me. They may have to understand the principle or rule of the case, but I 
must understand the case as a whole, from which I generate the holding 
that I tell to the class. 
Pedagogically speaking, while both modes of address-telling and 
showing-have value, they function in different ways. Telling you some-
thing may seem the more explicit way to convey a thesis or idea. Telling you 
what I want you to learn or know may be efficient or economical in 
conveying my message, and these are important values in education. 
Sometimes, too, this may be the best way of getting the message across, of 
getting the students to learn the lesson I wish them to learn. But for all its 
efficiency and economy and "precision," this mode of address has its costs, 
and pedagogically speaking they can be steep. 
Teaching by telling may convey finished thoughts or ideas explicitly, but 
its very explicitness and the "finish" of its ideas may make it too "clean" an 
educational process for its own good-or, rather, for the good of the 
students. First of all, only certain kinds of ideas can be conveyed in an 
explicit, finished form. Not every idea is best expressed in this form Gust as 
not every idea is best expressed by a theory or a definition or a rule or a 
proposition). Wittgenstein gives an example: 
One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with blurred edges.-"But is 
a blurred concept a concept at all?"-Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a 
person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a 
sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one often exactly what we need? (§71a) 
An explicit message (no matter how "precise") may sometimes be a 
misleading message, because it is an inaccurate or inadequate expression of 
what is known or intended. Some knowledge of some matters (for example, 
our knowledge of language, of law, of any human activity, of any person) 
may not be expressible in rule or propositional form (the two forms most 
apt to be used in conveying explicit messages). Wittgenstein again illustrates 
the point: 
What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it mean, to know it and not 
be able to say it? Is this knowledge somehow equivalent to an unformulated 
definition? So that if it were formulated I should be able to recognize it as the 
expression of my knowledge? Isn't my knowledge, my concept of a game, 
completely expressed in the explanations that I could give? That is, in my 
describing examples of various kinds of game; shewing how all sorts of other 
games can be constructed on the analogy of these; saying that I should scarcely 
include this or this among games; and so on. (§75) 
Compare knowing and saying: 
how many feet high Mont Blanc is-
how the word "game" is used-
how a clarinet sounds. 
If you are surprised that one can know something and not be able to say it, you 
are perhaps thinking. of a case like the first. Certainly not of one like the third. 
~~ . 
What we know about a matter cannot always be said or stated. It may, 
however, still be expressible or teachable in other ways. In particular, we 
may express or teach something by means of examples or stories. 
[T]his is just how one might explain to someone what a game is. One gives 
examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way.-I do not, however, 
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mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that common thing 
which I-for some reason-was unable to express; but that he is now to employ 
those examples in a particular way. Here giving examples is not an indirect means 
of explaining-in default of a better. For any general definition can be misun-
derstood too. The point is that this is how we play the game. (I mean the 
language-game with the word "game".) (§71b) 
Teaching by showing-by giving examples and telling stories and asking 
the students to read and understand the materials on their own-is not 
necessarily a second-best means of teaching. It is not necessarily an indirect 
way of teaching something that one wishes to teach some other way but 
cannot. It is not necessarily done "in default of a better [way]" (§71b). It can 
be a way of teaching something that otherwise cannot be taught or 
communicated. 
Law students learn some of the implicit or inexpressible aspects oflaw by 
doing the work themselves when they are shown cases and statutes and 
legislative materials and briefs and memoranda and th~n asked to make of 
them what they can. In other words, the traditional law school method of 
"immersion" in the destructive- element,10 of sink or swim, has as its point 
the teaching of something latent in the world or language of the law. In this 
kind of teaching, the teacher does not tell the student what the teacher 
thinks (or wants), perhaps because the teacher cannot express it himself or 
herself, or perhaps because (even if he or she could express it) the teacher 
thinks that there is something valuable to be gained or learned by the 
student doing this work himself or herself. Again, as Wittgenstein says 
(§71b), it is not as though the teacher expects the student to hit upon some 
definition or theory the teacher cannot himself or herself formulate. 
Rather, the materials convey a sense of the legal world, oflegal context and 
circumstance and significance, of working with the form of life known as 
"the law," that cannot otherwise be conveyed or assimilated. The teacher 
expects the student to see this, to experience it, and then to go on to use his 
or her materials in a different (more professional) way. 
Although showing may be less explicit pedagogically in conveying a 
particular message, it is apt to be more adequate in teaching the full lesson 
available to be learned. If part of the lesson is designed for the students to 
learn the process of discovering and expressing legal insights and percep-
tions and discriminations, for example, then the process cannot be taught 
or learned solely from lectures stating rules or propositions about law (or 
legal writing and research). In learning one's way around the common law, 
for example, how one learns to read and apply cases, how one learns to state 
holdings and dicta and apply rules to new situations, is more important 
than any particular rule or holding or application that one learns for any 
specific case. Also, the common law trains one to realize that matters of 
10. Joseph Conrad, Lord Jim 214 (1890; reprint, Oxford, 1983): 
"'Yes! Very funny this terrible thing is. A man that is born falls into a dream like 
a man who falls into the sea. If he tries to climb out into the air as inexperienced 
people endeavour to do, he drowns-nicht wahr? . . . No! I tell you! The way 
is to the destructive element submit yourself, and with the exertions of your 
hands and feet in the water make the deep, deep sea keep you up. So if you ask 
me-how to be?' ... 
. . . 'And yet it is true-it is true. In the destructive element immerse.' " 
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procedure and substance are reciprocal and interrelated, and that this 
duality of perspective must be internalized before one can become a 
competent lawyer or come to know and understand the law. 
In law school, of course, students hunger for "black letter" law. They 
actually think that the law exists in this form, or that this is the standard or 
normal or ordinary form in which law exists. The common law tradition 
teaches otherwise; it suggests that legal rules are formulable quite variously, 
and that the propriety of any particular formulation of a rule is a functipn 
of the individual case in which the rule arises and the string of cases out of 
which it grows.! 1 Unless our students understand how black-letter rules are 
generated and elicited and abstracted from the cases and their contexts, 
they understand little or nothing of what they need to know-as 
professionals-about the law and its uses. And because the "black letter" 
view of law is a view of which our students must be disabused again and 
again, we teach this lesson again and again by asking them (among other 
things) to read and state the cases for themselves, to puzzle over their 
inclinations with respect to horrible hypotheticals and imagined cases, and 
to put together fields of law on their own. . 
It is important to notice that this mode of teaching-showing our 
students cases or examples or stories or hypotheticals and making them 
work their ways through them on their own-presupposes that there is an 
element in the law that cannot othen'lise be taught or communicated. This 
is the latent aspect of law, akin to the latency we find (and Wittgenstein 
acknowledges) in language. Although some matters about the law may be 
teachable and convey able in rule or propositional form, certainly not all 
elements of law are so teachable or expressible, and this seems to include 
many of the most important aspects of the law. 
Furthermore, this mode of teaching requires the use of imagination on 
the part of both teacher and student. The teacher must imagine what is 
possible to do within a given profession with the materials at hand, and 
what might suggest or produce an education in these possibilities; the 
student must see what is being made available to him or her by way of this 
lesson and must be able to imagine what might be made out of the materials 
and lesson as offered. Learning the implicit or latent aspects of law (or of 
language) requires students to complete what the teacher begins. As 
Wittgenstein indicates, the student must be capable of doing something if 
education is to take place. Teachers can be as inviting or as provocative as 
possible with their examples and stories, but if the student fails to do 
something with these materials, instruction ends. 
Wittgenstein also emphasizes the need to activate our knowledge. He 
understands that we have acquired much that is implicit or latent when we 
learn language, and his use of examples and stories is meant to activate this 
knowledge, to remind us of it. So, too, does the Socratic method in law 
11. Brian Simpson's article on the common law illustrates this point in a persuasive way. See 
A. W. B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence, Second Series, ed. A. W. B. Simpson, 77 (Oxford, 1973). I have said 
more about the role of rules in the common law in Thomas D. Eisele, The Activity of 
Being a Lawyer, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 345, 372-74, 379-80 (1987). 
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school aim at activating the implicit or latent knowledge that law students 
acquire when they learn law. The reminders that law teachers give, the 
hypotheticals, the leading or rhetorical questions, the pointing to differ-
ences and similarities, the goading of response; all of these and many more 
attributes of the Socratic method are ways of getting law students to activate 
knowledge of the law that they possess but that remains latent, 
unconscious. 12 
Wittgenstein is pursuing the same goal of activating our knowledge by 
his strategy in section 1. For instance, in the third paragraph he first states 
his criticism of Augustine's story, remarking that Augustine has treated the 
class of nonnaming words "as something that will take care of itself" (§ lc). 
This statement mayor may not work, in anq of itself, to activate our 
knowledge of just how various the functions of words are, but Wittgenstein 
does not leave the matter there. Instead, he prods us to activate our 
knowledge of the variety of word-functions by giving us in the fourth 
paragraph the story of the grocer and "five red apples." The story is 
intended not only to illustrate his criticism in the preceding paragraph but 
also to enliven our implicit knowledge of language on which that criticism 
is based. Wittgenstein, in other words, is trying to bring us to consciousness 
of something we already know but about which we might not think Gust as 
Augustine did not think about it) unless we have the stimulus of Wittgen-
stein's question and story. We law teachers seek to do the same to our law 
students (and-ourselves) by way of the case method and Socratic teaching 
(with, I suppose, the same mixed results). 
IV. Disclaiming Knowledge in Oneself, and Inviting It in Others 
Wittgenstein was aware of the implicit or latent quality in language and 
in learning, and he prized it. About one of Tolstoy's books, for example, he 
told Norman Malcolm: 
I once tried to read 'Resurrection' but couldn't. You see, when Tolstoy just tells a 
story he impresses me infinitely more than when he addresses the reader. When 
he turns his back to the reader then he seems to me most impressive. Perhaps one 
day we can talk about this. It seems to me his philosophy is most true when it's 
latent in the story. IS 
We might generalize this perception by saying that, for Wittgenstein, 
philosophy is "most true when it's latent in the story" that any person tells. 
In practice, this means that Wittgenstein disclaims or disavows theoretical 
knowledge of the matters about which he speaks and instead simply 
continues ceaselessly to pursue by means of his philosophical investigations 
practical knowledge and understanding of the problems bothering him. 
Most frequently, this commitment takes the form of using and investigating 
stories. His lessons are implicit in these stories, and he leaves them latent, 
pending, perhaps prompting. 
12. It is not always knowledge of law specifically that we wish our students to recall or 
activate. Because law is a language related to other languages, including the language of 
ordinary life and the language of ethics, we frequently need to remind our students 
about what they know in those related realms. See, e.g., White, The Judicial Opinion, 
supra note 2, at 1690, 1697-98. 
13. Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir 43 (New York, 1958) (emphasis in 
original). 
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Wittgenstein's refusal to speak in terms of explicit theories or definitions 
or scientific hypotheses or logical demonstrations is deliberate. Whatever 
insights his philosophy may offer, they cannot be separated from the 
contexts in which they are produced or the ways in which they are 
expressed. Wittgenstein developed his later philosophy in part as a re-
sponse to the explicit theorizing and logical mode of his own earlier 
philosophy in the Tracta~us Logico-Philosophicus. And he said as much in the 
preface to the Investigations. 
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into . . . a 
whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would 
never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I 
tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclina-
tion.-And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investiga-
tion. For this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every 
direction.-The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of 
sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved 
joumeyings. (v) 
A student of his philosophy must accept or at least understand the spirit 
in which it is written or expressed. As Stanley Cavell says, "The first thing 
to be said in accounting for his style is that he writes: he does not report, he 
does not write up results. Nobody would forge a style so personal who had 
not wanted and needed to find the right expression for his thought."14 His 
writing has mystified many readers, depressed others, and outraged most of 
the rest. Especially among professional philosophers, Wittgenstein's prose 
has been taken to be professionally unassimilable, almost untranslatable. 
Some take this as evidence not only of Wittgenstein's refusal to be pinned 
down to a testable thesis but also of a perverse pleasure in defeating the 
expectations of his readers. But Wittgenstein's later writing style can instead 
be understood as a part of his faithfulness to his duty as a teacher and to his 
conception of what it is to teach someone (either himself or another) 
something. In particular, Wittgenstein shows himself willing·to instruct us 
by vying with US. I5 
One way Wittgenstein vies with his students and readers is by refusing to 
try to tell them something that he believes can be correctly understood or 
learned only by confronting and experiencing it. He does this not to be coy 
or perverse, not to make the student or reader suffer, but to make him or 
her work. What he has to say and to show is difficult and requires work to 
grasp and understand. The educational value of showing is that this mode of 
address requires you to do something active as a part of your education. You 
must participate in your education in a way that telling as a mode of address 
does not require. 
Therefore, to be fair to this philosophy, to respond justly, requires us to 
do more than simply read its words and understand its catch-phrases, or to 
memorize Wittgenstein's theses and theories. It requires us, rather, to 
generate our own views by reading as well as we can; by giving weight to its 
words, its sentences, its pauses, and its omissions; by assessing its expres-
14. Stanley Cavell, The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, in Must We Mean 
What We Say? supra note 1, at 70 (emphasis in original). 
15. See Cavell, supra note 1, at xxiv-xxv. 
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sions and claims; by projecting its sketches into the contexts of our lives and 
studying them there, for whatever grasp or purchase on our lives these 
sketches may afford. All of this and more amounts to what I wish to call 
(following Richard Poirier's characterization of Robert Frost's poetry) "the 
work of knowing."16 
The same kind of work is required of students in learning the law, in 
being fair to the common law tradition. Thus, we introduce our students to 
the law, not by lecturing, not by telling them what the law is, but by showing 
them the law in action in case after case. They discover and teach 
themselves the law not from outlines or guides or lectures but from cases 
and classroom performances, and this constitutes their instruction in 
becoming lawyers. 
If this method of teaching places substantial responsibility on the 
shoulders of the students, it also enacts a noble equality between teacher 
and students, for it acknowledges two things at once. First, it shows students 
that no one is in any better position than themselves to claim to know and 
understand the workings of the law. Certainly not the teacher, who has no 
special dispensation from human foibles, no special route or means of 
access to the "truth" about such things. If the teacher is in any better 
position to speak on these matters, then this can be the case only because he 
or she has worked at it, has labored to make himself or herself intelligent and 
intelligible. The students are free to make themselves equally conversant, 
equally informed, and in fact are encouraged to do so. Nothing stands in 
their way or keeps them from doing so-unless the desire to know is greater 
in one person than in another. Again, this is a lesson taught latently by the 
Socratic method, as it was taught latently by Socrates. 
When Socrates learned that the Oracle had said no man is wiser than Socrates, he 
interpreted this to mean, we are told, that he knew that he did not know. And we 
are likely to take this as a bit of faded irony or as a stuffy humility. What I take 
Socrates to have seen is that, about the questions which were causing him wonder 
and hope and confusion and pain, he knew that he did not know what no man can 
know, and that any man could learn what he wanted to learn. No man is in any 
better position for knowing it than any other man-unless wanting to know is a 
special positionP 
Second, this placement of responsibility on the shoulders of the students 
effectively makes room for them to participate in the life and work of the 
law (or of philosophy), which is exactly the way in which children learn to 
speak. We invite them to participate in this form oflife, we initiate them into 
it, by making room for them in our conversations and our lives. This invites 
them to participate in the task of making our lives intelligible, of making 
sense of our lives (through the medium of law, or philosophy, or ordinary 
language). This gesture enacts simultaneously a silencing or self-effacing of 
the teacher and an encouragement of the students. It creates room for 
them in which to test and try out their voices, their professional personae 
and roles, their attempts at making meaningful contributions to the form of 
life in which they are becoming participants. 
16. Richard Poirier, Robert Frost: The Work of Knowing (New York, 1977). 
17. Cavell, supra note 1, at xxviii (emphasis in original). 
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Sometimes our students find us intimidating, and to this extent we stifle 
rather than stimulate them. By telling stories, inviting their response, 
asking them questions, giving them cases to state and apply, we can prod 
our students past this obstacle. We can invite them to share with us (and the 
others in class) their sense of what the stories and cases show, of what is 
latent, what patent in them, and of what lesson they may teach us. In such 
a class, no one voice dominates, no one voice tells all. The materials can be 
said to speak for themselves, as long as we understand that this occurs only 
as it ever can in this life: the materials have all of us through which to make 
themselves heard. 
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